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EvoLudoLab: 2x2 Game - Dominance B: Difference between revisions
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EvoLudoLab: 2x2 Game - Dominance B (view source)
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{{EvoLudoLab:2x2| | {{EvoLudoLab:2x2| | ||
options="--run --delay 200 --view Strategies_-_Mean --reportfreq 0.5 --popsize 10000 --popupdate | options="--game 2x2 --run --delay 200 --view Strategies_-_Mean --reportfreq 0.5 --popsize 10000 --popupdate async --playerupdate imitate --geometry M --intertype a --numinter 1 --references a --init 1,999 --inittype frequencies --mutation 0.0 --basefit 1.0 --selection 1.0 --reward 1.0 --punishment 0.0 --temptation 1.16 --sucker -0.16"| | ||
title=Type B dominates| | title=Type B dominates| | ||
doc=Irrespective of the initial configuration, type <math>B</math> players steadily increase and eventually take over the entire population. | doc=Irrespective of the initial configuration, type <math>B</math> players steadily increase and eventually take over the entire population. | ||
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In the context of cooperation, this scenario is captured by the Prisoner's Dilemma: Defection is the better option regardless of the co-player's decision. However, as a consequence both players end up with the punishment payoff <math>P</math> instead of the more favorable reward <math>R</math> for mutual cooperation. This generates a conflict of interest between the individual and the group (in this case the pair of interacting players). In the absence of any additional mechanisms such as repeated interactions, spatial extension, structured populations etc. cooperative behavior is bound to go extinct. | In the context of cooperation, this scenario is captured by the Prisoner's Dilemma: Defection is the better option regardless of the co-player's decision. However, as a consequence both players end up with the punishment payoff <math>P</math> instead of the more favorable reward <math>R</math> for mutual cooperation. This generates a conflict of interest between the individual and the group (in this case the pair of interacting players). In the absence of any additional mechanisms such as repeated interactions, spatial extension, structured populations etc. cooperative behavior is bound to go extinct. | ||
The applet above has <math>R = 1, P = 0, T = 1.16</math> and <math>S = -0.16</math> with players imitating better strategies proportional to the payoff difference. The population size is 10'000 and the initial fraction of cooperators 99%.}} | The applet above has <math>R = 1, P = 0, T = 1.16</math> and <math>S = -0.16</math> with players imitating better strategies proportional to the payoff difference. The population size is 10'000 and the initial fraction of cooperators 99.9%.}} | ||
[[Category: Christoph Hauert]] | [[Category: Christoph Hauert]] | ||
