EvoLudoLab: Continuous Snowdrift Game - Branching: Difference between revisions

EvoLudoLab: Continuous Snowdrift Game - Branching (view source)

2 bytes added , 13 October 2023

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 {{EvoLudoLab:CSD|
-options="--game cSD --run --delay 100 --view Strategies_-_Distribution --reportfreq 20 --popsize 5000 --popupdate async --playerupdate imitate --geometry M --intertype a --numinter 1 --references a --benefitfcn 11 --benefitparams 6,-1.4 --costfcn 1 --costparams 4.56,-1.6 --init 0.2,0.05 --inittype gaussian --mutation 0.01 --mutationtype g --mutationsdev 0.01"|
+options="--game cSD --run --delay 100 --view Strategies_-_Distribution --reportfreq 20 --popsize 5000 --popupdate async --playerupdate imitate --geometry M --intertype r1 --numinter 1 --references r1 --benefitfcn 11 --benefitparams 6,-1.4 --costfcn 1 --costparams 4.56,-1.6 --init 0.2,0.05 --inittype gaussian --mutation 0.01 --mutationtype g --mutationsdev 0.01"|
 title=Continuous Snowdrift game: Branching|
 doc=Driven by selection and mutation, the population first converges to the convergent stable intermediate level of investments \(x^* = 0.6\). However, since \(x^*\) is not evolutionarily stable, adjacent strategies can invade leading to evolutionary branching, i.e. separating the population into two phenotypic clusters of high and low investing individuals. This process provides a quite natural explanation for the emergence of discrete strategies such as cooperators and defectors.