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EvoLudoLab: Continuous Snowdrift Game - Repellor: Difference between revisions
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EvoLudoLab: Continuous Snowdrift Game - Repellor (view source)
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{{EvoLudoLab:CSD| | {{EvoLudoLab:CSD| | ||
options="--game cSD --run --delay 200 --view Strategies_-_Distribution --reportfreq 50 --popsize 5000 --popupdate | options="--game cSD --run --delay 200 --view Strategies_-_Distribution --reportfreq 50 --popsize 5000 --popupdate async --playerupdate imitate --geometry M --intertype r1 --numinter 1 --references r1 --benefitfcn 11 --benefitparams 3.4,-0.5 --costfcn 1 --costparams 4,-1.5 --init 0.5,0.01 --inittype gaussian --mutation 0.01 --mutationtype g --mutationsdev 0.01"| | ||
title=Continuous Snowdrift game: Repellor| | title=Continuous Snowdrift game: Repellor| | ||
doc=In this scenario, selection and mutation drives the population away from the singular strategy \(x^* = 0.6\), i.e. \(x^*\) is a repellor. The final state of the population now depends on the initial configuration of the population. If the initial strategy was \(x_0 < x^*\) then the investments decrease over time and defectors reign. However, if \(x_0 > x^*\) holds the population evolves towards a cooperative state with maximal investments. Also note that if \(x_0\) lies close to \(x^*\) then few mutants may diffuse to the other side of \(x^*\) and then again two branches evolve. But in contrast to evolutionary branching, this process is not generic as it requires a particular preparation of the initial configuration. | doc=In this scenario, selection and mutation drives the population away from the singular strategy \(x^* = 0.6\), i.e. \(x^*\) is a repellor. The final state of the population now depends on the initial configuration of the population. If the initial strategy was \(x_0 < x^*\) then the investments decrease over time and defectors reign. However, if \(x_0 > x^*\) holds the population evolves towards a cooperative state with maximal investments. Also note that if \(x_0\) lies close to \(x^*\) then few mutants may diffuse to the other side of \(x^*\) and then again two branches evolve. But in contrast to evolutionary branching, this process is not generic as it requires a particular preparation of the initial configuration. | ||
