EvoLudoLab: Ecological Public Goods Game - No Q, cooperation
Along the bottom of the applet there are several buttons to control the execution and the speed of the simulations - for details see the EvoLudo GUI documentation. Of particular importance are the parameters button and the data views pop-up list along the top. The former opens a panel that allows to set and change various parameters concerning the game as well as the population structure, while the latter displays the simulation data in different ways.
No interior fixed point Q - cooperation
For high \(r\), the interior fixed point \(Q\) disappears and the high density saddle node along \(f = 1\) (no defectors) becomes a stable equilibrium. Cooperators and defectors can no longer co-exist but now its only the defectors that disappear, at least for favorable initial conditions. As always, severe exploitation and low population densities result in extinction.
The parameters are \(r = 7.9\), \(N = 8\), \(c = 1\), \(b = 0\), \(d = 1.6\) using numerical integration of the replicator equation. Note that changing \(d\) was for purely cosmetic reasons - qualitatively the same results are obtained for \(d = 0.5\) and \(r = 7.9\) only with a much larger cooperator density at equilibrium
|Snapshot of the spatial arrangement of strategies.|
|Time evolution of the strategy frequencies.|
|Strategy frequencies plotted in the simplex \(S_3\). If no calculation is running, mouse clicks set the initial frequencies of strategies and stops the calculations otherwise (for the ODE solver it switches to backwards integration).|
|Frequencies plotted in the phase plane spanned by the population density (\(u + v = 1 - w\)) and the relative frequency of cooperators (\(f = u / (u + v)\)). Again, mouse clicks set the initial frequencies of strategies, stop the simulations or switch to backward integration|
|Snapshot of the spatial distribution of payoffs.|
|Time evolution of average population payoff bounded by the minimum and maximum individual payoff.|
|Snapshot of payoff distribution in population.|
The list below describes only the parameters related to the public goods game and the population dynamics. Follow the link for a complete list and descriptions of all other parameters such as spatial arrangements or update rules on the player and population level.
- multiplication factor \(r\) of public good.
- cost of cooperation \(c\) (investment into common pool).
- Lone cooperator's payoff
- payoff for a cooperator if no one else joins the public goods interaction.
- Lone defector's payoff
- payoff for a defector if no one else joins the public goods interaction.
- Base birthrate
- baseline reproductive rate of all individuals. The effective birthrate is affected by the individual's performance in the public goods game and additionally depends on the availability of empty space.
- constant death rate of all individuals.
- Init Coop, init defect, init empty
- initial densities of cooperators, defectors and empty space. If they do not add up to 100%, the values will be scaled accordingly.