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EvoLudoLab: Spatial 2x2 Game - Bistability: Difference between revisions
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EvoLudoLab: Spatial 2x2 Game - Bistability (view source)
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{{EvoLudoLab:2x2| | {{EvoLudoLab:2x2| | ||
options="--run --delay 200 --view 0 --reportfreq 1.0 --popsize 100x --popupdate | options="--game 2x2 --run --delay 200 --view 0 --reportfreq 1.0 --popsize 100x --popupdate async --playerupdate imitate --geometry m --intertype a --numinter 1 --references a --init 45,55 --inittype frequencies --mutation 0.0 --basefit 1.0 --selection 1.0 --reward 1.0 --punishment 0.0 --temptation 0.9 --sucker -0.6"| | ||
title=Bistability| | title=Bistability| | ||
doc=In well-mixed populations either type \(A\) or type \(B\) players thrive and take over the entire population. In spatial populations the same holds but the odds are hugely in favor of \(A\) types because they no longer need to exceed the threshold frequency on a global scale but rather only locally. Therefore, a sufficiently big initial cluster of \(A\)'s exists, ensures their survival and seeds their victory | doc=In well-mixed populations either type \(A\) or type \(B\) players thrive and take over the entire population. In spatial populations the same holds but the odds are hugely in favor of \(A\) types because they no longer need to exceed the threshold frequency on a global scale but rather only locally. Therefore, provided that a sufficiently big initial cluster of \(A\)'s exists, ensures their survival and seeds their victory. Otherwise they quickly disappear within the first few generations. | ||
The bi-stability of this system is nicely illustrated when running the above setting several times. Sometimes the system converges to all cooperators and sometimes all defectors. The parameters are set to \(R = 1, P = 0, T = 0.9\) and \(S = -0.54\) with Moore neighborhood and players imitating better strategies proportional to the payoff difference and an initial fraction of 50% \(A\)'s.}} | The bi-stability of this system is nicely illustrated when running the above setting several times. Sometimes the system converges to all cooperators and sometimes all defectors. The parameters are set to \(R = 1, P = 0, T = 0.9\) and \(S = -0.54\) with Moore neighborhood and players imitating better strategies proportional to the payoff difference and an initial fraction of 50% \(A\)'s.}} | ||
[[Category: Christoph Hauert]] | [[Category: Christoph Hauert]] | ||
