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{{CompactTOC|left=yes|name=Publication year|alpha=no|side=yes|custom1=2001|custom2=2002|custom3=2003|custom4=2004|custom5=2005|custom6=2006|custom7=2007|custom8=2008|custom9=2009|custom10=2010}}
{{CompactTOC|left=yes|name=Publication year|alpha=no|side=yes|custom1=2001|custom2=2002|custom3=2003|custom4=2004|custom5=2005|custom6=2006|custom7=2007|custom8=2008|custom9=2009|custom10=2010|custom11=2011|custom12=2012}}


The following list of selected publications features articles that explicitely refer to the ''EvoLudo'' simulator (previously known as ''VirtualLabs'') or present results based on the simulation framework of the ''EvoLudo'' simulator. For a complete list of publications and PDF downloads please visit my [http://www.math.ubc.ca/~hauert homepage].
The following list of selected publications features articles that explicitely refer to the ''EvoLudo'' simulator (previously known as ''VirtualLabs'') or present results based on the simulation framework of the ''EvoLudo'' simulator. For a complete list of publications and PDF downloads please visit my [http://www.math.ubc.ca/~hauert homepage].
==2012==
===[[Deme Structured Populations|Evolutionary Games in Deme Structured, Finite Populations]]===
with Lorens Imhof, ''J. theor. Biol.'' '''299''' 106-112 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.06.010 doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.06.010].
==2011==
===[[Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics|Pattern formation and chaos in spatial ecological public goods games]]===
with Joe Yuichiro Wakano, ''J. theor. Biol.'' '''268''' 30-38 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.09.036 doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.09.036]


==2010==
==2010==
===[[Evolution of Sanctioning Institutions| Social learning promotes institutions for governing the commons]]===
===[[Evolution of Sanctioning Institutions| Social learning promotes institutions for governing the commons]]===
[[Image:Cover Nature.466.7308.png|left|border|120px]]
[[Image:Cover Nature.466.7308.png|left|border|120px]]
with Karl Sigmund, Hannelore De Silva & Arne Traulsen (2010) ''Nature'' '''466''', 861-863.
with Karl Sigmund, Hannelore De Silva & Arne Traulsen (2010) ''Nature'' '''466''', 861-863 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nature09203 doi: 10.1038/nature09203].


'''Summary:'''
'''Summary:'''
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===[[Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics| Spatial dynamics of ecological public goods]]===
===[[Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics| Spatial dynamics of ecological public goods]]===
[[Image:Cover PNAS 2009.106.19.png|left|border|120px]]
[[Image:Cover PNAS 2009.106.19.png|left|border|120px]]
with Joe Yuichiro Wakano & Martin A. Nowak (2009) ''Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA'' '''106''', 7910-7914.
with Joe Yuichiro Wakano & Martin A. Nowak (2009) ''Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA'' '''106''', 7910-7914 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0812644106 doi: 10.1073/pnas.0812644106].


'''Summary:'''
'''Summary:'''
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{{-}}
{{-}}


===[[Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment| Exploration dynamics in evolutionary games]]===
===[[Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment|Exploration dynamics in evolutionary games]]===
[[Image:Cover PNAS 2009.106.png|left|border|120px]]
[[Image:Cover PNAS 2009.106.png|left|border|120px]]
with Arne Traulsen, Hannelore Brandt, Martin A. Nowak & Karl Sigmund (2009) ''Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA'' '''106''', 709-712.
with Arne Traulsen, Hannelore Brandt, Martin A. Nowak & Karl Sigmund (2009) ''Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA'' '''106''', 709-712 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0808450106 doi: 10.1073/pnas.0808450106].


'''Summary:'''
'''Summary:'''
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===[[Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics|Ecological public goods games: Cooperation and bifurcation]]===
===[[Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics|Ecological public goods games: Cooperation and bifurcation]]===
[[Image:Cover TPB 2008.73.png|left|border|120px]]
[[Image:Cover TPB 2008.73.png|left|border|120px]]
with Joe Yuichiro Wakano & Michael Doebeli (2008) ''Theor. Pop. Biol.'' '''73''', 257-263.
with Joe Yuichiro Wakano & Michael Doebeli (2008) ''Theor. Pop. Biol.'' '''73''', 257-263 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tpb.2007.11.007 doi: 10.1016/j.tpb.2007.11.007].


'''Summary:'''
'''Summary:'''
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===[[Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment]]===
===[[Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment]]===
[[Image:Cover Science 2007.316.png|left|border|120px]]
[[Image:Cover Science 2007.316.png|left|border|120px]]
with Arne Traulsen, Hannelore Brandt, Martin A. Nowak & Karl Sigmund (2007) ''Science'' '''316''', 1905-1907.
with Arne Traulsen, Hannelore Brandt, Martin A. Nowak & Karl Sigmund (2007) ''Science'' '''316''', 1905-1907 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1141588 doi: 10.1126/science.1141588].


'''Summary:'''
'''Summary:'''
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===[[Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics|Evolutionary games and population dynamics: maintenance of cooperation in public goods games]]===
===[[Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics|Evolutionary games and population dynamics: maintenance of cooperation in public goods games]]===
[[Image:Cover PRSB 2006.273.png|left|border|120px]]
[[Image:Cover PRSB 2006.273.png|left|border|120px]]
with Miranda Holmes & Michael Doebeli (2006) ''Proc. R. Soc. London B'' '''273''', 2565-2570.
with Miranda Holmes & Michael Doebeli (2006) ''Proc. R. Soc. London B'' '''273''', 2565-2570 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2006.3600 doi: 10.1098/rspb.2006.3600].


'''Summary:'''
'''Summary:'''
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===[[Evolutionary dynamics on graphs|A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks]]===
===[[Evolutionary dynamics on graphs|A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks]]===
[[Image:Cover Nature 2006.441.png|left|border|120px]]
[[Image:Cover Nature 2006.441.png|left|border|120px]]
with Hisashi Ohtsuki, Erez Lieberman & Martin Nowak (2006) ''Nature'' '''441''', 502-505.
with Hisashi Ohtsuki, Erez Lieberman & Martin Nowak (2006) ''Nature'' '''441''', 502-505 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nature04605 doi: 10.1038/nature04605].


'''Summary:'''
'''Summary:'''
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===[[Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment|Punishing and abstaining for public goods]]===
===[[Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment|Punishing and abstaining for public goods]]===
[[Image:Cover PNAS 2006.103.png|left|border|120px]]
[[Image:Cover PNAS 2006.103.png|left|border|120px]]
with Hannelore Brandt & Karl Sigmund (2006) ''Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA'' '''103''', 495-497.
with Hannelore Brandt & Karl Sigmund (2006) ''Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA'' '''103''', 495-497 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0507229103 doi: 10.1073/pnas.0507229103].


'''Summary:'''
'''Summary:'''
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===[[Synergy and discounting of cooperation in social dilemmas]]===
===[[Synergy and discounting of cooperation in social dilemmas]]===
[[Image:Cover JtB 2006.239.png|left|border|120px]]
[[Image:Cover JtB 2006.239.png|left|border|120px]]
with Franziska Michor, Martin Nowak & Michael Doebeli (2006) ''J. theor. Biol.'' '''239''', 195-202, Special Issue in Memory of John Maynard Smith.
with Franziska Michor, Martin Nowak & Michael Doebeli (2006) ''J. theor. Biol.'' '''239''', 195-202, Special Issue in Memory of John Maynard Smith [http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2005.08.040 doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2005.08.040].


'''Summary:'''
'''Summary:'''
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===[[Synergy & discounting of cooperation in social dilemmas|Spatial effects in social dilemmas]]===
===[[Synergy & discounting of cooperation in social dilemmas|Spatial effects in social dilemmas]]===
[[Image:Cover JtB 2006.240.png|left|border|120px]]
[[Image:Cover JtB 2006.240.png|left|border|120px]]
(2006) ''J. theor. Biol.'' '''240''', 627-636.
(2006) ''J. theor. Biol.'' '''240''', 627-636 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2005.10.024 doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2005.10.024].


'''Summary:'''
'''Summary:'''
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===[[Evolutionary dynamics on graphs]]===
===[[Evolutionary dynamics on graphs]]===
[[Image:Cover Nature 2005.433.png|left|border|120px]]
[[Image:Cover Nature 2005.433.png|left|border|120px]]
with Erez Lieberman & Martin Nowak (2005) ''Nature'' '''433''', 312-316.
with Erez Lieberman & Martin Nowak (2005) ''Nature'' '''433''', 312-316 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nature03204 doi: 10.1038/nature03204].


'''Summary:'''
'''Summary:'''
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===[[Cooperation in structured populations|Models of cooperation based on the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snowdrift game]]===
===[[Cooperation in structured populations|Models of cooperation based on the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snowdrift game]]===
[[Image:Cover EcolLett 2005.8.png|left|border|120px]]
[[Image:Cover EcolLett 2005.8.png|left|border|120px]]
with Michael Doebeli (2005) ''Ecology Letters'' '''8''' (7) 748-766.
with Michael Doebeli (2005) ''Ecology Letters'' '''8''' (7) 748-766 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1461-0248.2005.00773.x doi: 10.1111/j.1461-0248.2005.00773.x].


'''Summary:''' Understanding the evolution of cooperation through natural selection is a core problem in biology. Here, we review game theoretic models of cooperation that are based on two simple two-person games: the Prisoner's Dilemma, and the Snowdrift game. Both games have two strategies, to cooperate and to defect, and both games are social dilemmas. In social dilemmas, cooperation is prone to exploitation by defectors, and the average payoff in populations at evolutionary equilibrium is lower than in cooperator populations. The difference between the games is that cooperation is not maintained in the Prisoner's Dilemma, but persists in the Snowdrift game at intermediate frequencies. As a consequence, insights gained from studying extensions of the two games differ substantially. We review the most salient results obtained from extensions such as iteration, spatial structure, continuously variable cooperative investments, and multi-person interactions. Bridging the gap between theoretical and empirical research is one of the main challenges for future studies of cooperation, and we conclude by pointing out a number of promising natural systems in which the theory can be tested experimentally.
'''Summary:''' Understanding the evolution of cooperation through natural selection is a core problem in biology. Here, we review game theoretic models of cooperation that are based on two simple two-person games: the Prisoner's Dilemma, and the Snowdrift game. Both games have two strategies, to cooperate and to defect, and both games are social dilemmas. In social dilemmas, cooperation is prone to exploitation by defectors, and the average payoff in populations at evolutionary equilibrium is lower than in cooperator populations. The difference between the games is that cooperation is not maintained in the Prisoner's Dilemma, but persists in the Snowdrift game at intermediate frequencies. As a consequence, insights gained from studying extensions of the two games differ substantially. We review the most salient results obtained from extensions such as iteration, spatial structure, continuously variable cooperative investments, and multi-person interactions. Bridging the gap between theoretical and empirical research is one of the main challenges for future studies of cooperation, and we conclude by pointing out a number of promising natural systems in which the theory can be tested experimentally.
Line 110: Line 118:
===[[Origin of Cooperators and Defectors|The Evolutionary Origin of Cooperators and Defectors]]===
===[[Origin of Cooperators and Defectors|The Evolutionary Origin of Cooperators and Defectors]]===
[[Image:Cover Science 2004.306.png|left|border|120px]]
[[Image:Cover Science 2004.306.png|left|border|120px]]
with Michael Doebeli and Timothy Killingback (2004) ''Science'' '''306''', 859-862.
with Michael Doebeli and Timothy Killingback (2004) ''Science'' '''306''', 859-862 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1101456 doi: 10.1126/science.1101456].


'''Summary:'''
'''Summary:'''
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===[[Cooperation in structured populations|Spatial Structure Often Inhibits the Evolution of Cooperation in the Snowdrift Game]]===
===[[Cooperation in structured populations|Spatial Structure Often Inhibits the Evolution of Cooperation in the Snowdrift Game]]===
[[Image:Cover Nature 2004.428.png|left|border|120px]]
[[Image:Cover Nature 2004.428.png|left|border|120px]]
with Michael Doebeli (2004) ''Nature'' '''428''', 643-646.
with Michael Doebeli (2004) ''Nature'' '''428''', 643-646 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nature02360 doi: 10.1038/nature02360].


'''Summary:'''
'''Summary:'''
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===[[Voluntary Public Goods Games|Volunteering as Red Queen Mechanism for Cooperation in Public Goods Games]]===
===[[Voluntary Public Goods Games|Volunteering as Red Queen Mechanism for Cooperation in Public Goods Games]]===
[[Image:Cover Science 2002.296.png|left|border|120px]]
[[Image:Cover Science 2002.296.png|left|border|120px]]
with Silvia De Monte, Josef Hofbauer and Karl Sigmund (2002) ''Science'' '''296''' 1129-1132.
with Silvia De Monte, Josef Hofbauer and Karl Sigmund (2002) ''Science'' '''296''' 1129-1132 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1070582 doi: 10.1126/science.1070582].


'''Summary:'''
'''Summary:'''
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===[[Voluntary Public Goods Games|Phase Transitions and Volunteering in Spatial Public Goods Games]]===
===[[Voluntary Public Goods Games|Phase Transitions and Volunteering in Spatial Public Goods Games]]===
[[Image:Cover PRL 2002.89.png|left|border|120px]]
[[Image:Cover PRL 2002.89.png|left|border|120px]]
with György Szabó (2002) ''Physical Review Letters'' '''89''' (11) 118101.
with György Szabó (2002) ''Physical Review Letters'' '''89''' (11) 118101 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.89.118101 doi: 10.1103/PhysRevLett.89.118101].


'''Summary:'''
'''Summary:'''
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===[[Voluntary Public Goods Games|Prisoner's Dilemma and Public Goods Games in Different Geometries: Compulsory Versus Voluntary Interactions]]===
===[[Voluntary Public Goods Games|Prisoner's Dilemma and Public Goods Games in Different Geometries: Compulsory Versus Voluntary Interactions]]===
[[Image:Cover Complexity 2002.8.png|left|border|120px]]
[[Image:Cover Complexity 2002.8.png|left|border|120px]]
with György Szabó (2002) ''Complexity'' '''8''' (4) 31-38.
with György Szabó (2002) ''Complexity'' '''8''' (4) 31-38 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/cplx.10092 doi: 10.1002/cplx.10092].


'''Summary:'''  
'''Summary:'''  
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===[[2×2 Games|Effects of Space in 2×2 games]]===
===[[2×2 Games|Effects of Space in 2×2 games]]===
[[Image:Cover IJBC 2002.12.png|left|border|120px]]
[[Image:Cover IJBC 2002.12.png|left|border|120px]]
(2002) ''Int. Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos'' '''12''' 1531-1548
(2002) ''Int. Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos'' '''12''' 1531-1548 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S0218127402005273 doi: 10.1142/S0218127402005273].


'''Summary:'''  
'''Summary:'''  
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===[[Reward, punishment & reputation|Reward and punishment]]===
===[[Reward, punishment & reputation|Reward and punishment]]===
[[Image:Cover PNAS 2001.98.png|left|border|120px]]
[[Image:Cover PNAS 2001.98.png|left|border|120px]]
with Karl Sigmund & Martin A. Nowak (2001) ''Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA'' '''98''' 10757 - 10762.
with Karl Sigmund & Martin A. Nowak (2001) ''Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA'' '''98''' 10757-10762 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.161155698 doi: 10.1073/pnas.161155698].


'''Summary:'''  
'''Summary:'''  
Hauert
860

edits

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