EvoLudoLab: Spatial 2x2 Game - Coexistence - Revision history

Hauert at 21:50, 12 August 2024

2024-08-12T21:50:47Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 14:50, 12 August 2024
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	{{EvoLudoLab:2x2\|		{{EvoLudoLab:2x2\|
	options="--module 2x2 --run --delay 200 --view 0 --timestep 1.0 --popsize 100x --popupdate async --playerupdate imitate-better --geometry m --interactions a --references r1 --~~inittype~~ frequencies 9,1 --paymatrix 1,0.4;1.6,0 --traitnames A,B"\|		options="--module 2x2 --run --delay 200 --view 0 --timestep 1.0 --popsize 100x --popupdate async --playerupdate imitate-better --geometry m --interactions a --references r1 --init frequencies 9,1 --paymatrix 1,0.4;1.6,0 --traitnames A,B"\|
	title=Co-existence of type A and type B players\|		title=Co-existence of type A and type B players\|
	doc=In well-mixed populations type \(A\) and \(B\) players co-exist in a stable equilibrium almost irrespective of the initial configuration. Interestingly, however, spatial structure often shifts the equilibrium in favor of \(B\) players.		doc=In well-mixed populations type \(A\) and \(B\) players co-exist in a stable equilibrium almost irrespective of the initial configuration. Interestingly, however, spatial structure often shifts the equilibrium in favor of \(B\) players.

Hauert at 21:25, 4 August 2024

2024-08-04T21:25:38Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 14:25, 4 August 2024
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	{{EvoLudoLab:2x2\|		{{EvoLudoLab:2x2\|
	options="--module 2x2 --run --delay 200 --view 0 --timestep 1.0 --popsize 100x --popupdate async --playerupdate imitate --geometry m --interactions a --references r1 --inittype frequencies 9,1 --paymatrix 1,0.4;1.6,0 --traitnames A,B"\|		options="--module 2x2 --run --delay 200 --view 0 --timestep 1.0 --popsize 100x --popupdate async --playerupdate imitate-better --geometry m --interactions a --references r1 --inittype frequencies 9,1 --paymatrix 1,0.4;1.6,0 --traitnames A,B"\|
	title=Co-existence of type A and type B players\|		title=Co-existence of type A and type B players\|
	doc=In well-mixed populations type \(A\) and \(B\) players co-exist in a stable equilibrium almost irrespective of the initial configuration. Interestingly, however, spatial structure often shifts the equilibrium in favor of \(B\) players.		doc=In well-mixed populations type \(A\) and \(B\) players co-exist in a stable equilibrium almost irrespective of the initial configuration. Interestingly, however, spatial structure often shifts the equilibrium in favor of \(B\) players.

Hauert at 21:12, 4 August 2024

2024-08-04T21:12:51Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 14:12, 4 August 2024
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	{{EvoLudoLab:2x2\|		{{EvoLudoLab:2x2\|
	options="--~~game~~ 2x2 --run --delay 200 --view 0 --~~reportfreq~~ 1.0 --popsize 100x --popupdate async --playerupdate imitate --geometry m --~~intertype~~ a ~~--numinter 1~~ --references ~~a --init 1,9~~ --inittype frequencies ~~--mutation 0.0 --basefit 1.0 --selection~~ 1.0 --~~reward~~ 1~~.0 --punishment~~ 0.~~0 --temptation~~ 1.6 --~~sucker 0.4~~"\|		options="--module 2x2 --run --delay 200 --view 0 --timestep 1.0 --popsize 100x --popupdate async --playerupdate imitate --geometry m --interactions a --references r1 --inittype frequencies 9,1 --paymatrix 1,0.4;1.6,0 --traitnames A,B"\|
	title=Co-existence of type A and type B players\|		title=Co-existence of type A and type B players\|
	doc=In well-mixed populations type \(A\) and \(B\) players co-exist in a stable equilibrium almost irrespective of the initial configuration. Interestingly, however, spatial structure often shifts the equilibrium in favor of \(B\) players.		doc=In well-mixed populations type \(A\) and \(B\) players co-exist in a stable equilibrium almost irrespective of the initial configuration. Interestingly, however, spatial structure often shifts the equilibrium in favor of \(B\) players.

Hauert at 23:03, 13 October 2023

2023-10-13T23:03:04Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 16:03, 13 October 2023
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	{{EvoLudoLab:2x2\|		{{EvoLudoLab:2x2\|
	options="--~~run~~ --~~no3D~~ --delay 200 --view 0 --reportfreq 1.0 --popsize 100x --popupdate r --playerupdate ~~i --updateprob 1.0 --switchpref 0.0~~ --geometry m --intertype a1 --numinter 1 --~~reprotype a8~~ --~~initfreqs~~ 1:9 --mutation 0.0 --basefit 1.0 --selection 1.0 --reward 1.0 --punishment 0.0 --temptation 1.6 --sucker 0.4"\|		options="--game 2x2 --run --delay 200 --view 0 --reportfreq 1.0 --popsize 100x --popupdate async --playerupdate imitate --geometry m --intertype a --numinter 1 --references a --init 1,9 --inittype frequencies --mutation 0.0 --basefit 1.0 --selection 1.0 --reward 1.0 --punishment 0.0 --temptation 1.6 --sucker 0.4"\|
	title=Co-existence of type A and type B players\|		title=Co-existence of type A and type B players\|
	doc=In well-mixed populations type \(A\) and \(B\) players co-exist in a stable equilibrium almost irrespective of the initial configuration. Interestingly, however, spatial structure often shifts the equilibrium in favor of \(B\) players.		doc=In well-mixed populations type \(A\) and \(B\) players co-exist in a stable equilibrium almost irrespective of the initial configuration. Interestingly, however, spatial structure often shifts the equilibrium in favor of \(B\) players.

Hauert at 18:50, 22 November 2012

2012-11-22T18:50:42Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 11:50, 22 November 2012
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	{{EvoLudoLab:2x2\|		{{EvoLudoLab:2x2\|
	options="--run --delay 200 --view 0 --reportfreq 1.0 --popsize 100x --popupdate r --playerupdate i --updateprob 1.0 --switchpref 0.0 --geometry m --intertype a1 --numinter 1 --reprotype a8 --initfreqs 1:9 --mutation 0.0 --basefit 1.0 --selection 1.0 --reward 1.0 --punishment 0.0 --temptation 1.6 --sucker 0.4"\|		options="--run --no3D --delay 200 --view 0 --reportfreq 1.0 --popsize 100x --popupdate r --playerupdate i --updateprob 1.0 --switchpref 0.0 --geometry m --intertype a1 --numinter 1 --reprotype a8 --initfreqs 1:9 --mutation 0.0 --basefit 1.0 --selection 1.0 --reward 1.0 --punishment 0.0 --temptation 1.6 --sucker 0.4"\|
	title=Co-existence of type A and type B players\|		title=Co-existence of type A and type B players\|
	doc=In well-mixed populations type \(A\) and \(B\) players co-exist in a stable equilibrium almost irrespective of the initial configuration. Interestingly, however, spatial structure often shifts the equilibrium in favor of \(B\) players.		doc=In well-mixed populations type \(A\) and \(B\) players co-exist in a stable equilibrium almost irrespective of the initial configuration. Interestingly, however, spatial structure often shifts the equilibrium in favor of \(B\) players.

Hauert at 16:24, 12 June 2012

2012-06-12T16:24:19Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 09:24, 12 June 2012
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	options="--run --delay 200 --view 0 --reportfreq 1.0 --popsize 100x --popupdate r --playerupdate i --updateprob 1.0 --switchpref 0.0 --geometry m --intertype a1 --numinter 1 --reprotype a8 --initfreqs 1:9 --mutation 0.0 --basefit 1.0 --selection 1.0 --reward 1.0 --punishment 0.0 --temptation 1.6 --sucker 0.4"\|		options="--run --delay 200 --view 0 --reportfreq 1.0 --popsize 100x --popupdate r --playerupdate i --updateprob 1.0 --switchpref 0.0 --geometry m --intertype a1 --numinter 1 --reprotype a8 --initfreqs 1:9 --mutation 0.0 --basefit 1.0 --selection 1.0 --reward 1.0 --punishment 0.0 --temptation 1.6 --sucker 0.4"\|
	title=Co-existence of type A and type B players\|		title=Co-existence of type A and type B players\|
	doc=In well-mixed populations type ~~<math>~~A~~</math>~~ and ~~<math>~~B~~</math>~~ players co-exist in a stable equilibrium almost irrespective of the initial configuration. Interestingly, however, spatial structure often shifts the equilibrium in favor of ~~<math>~~B~~</math>~~ players.		doc=In well-mixed populations type \(A\) and \(B\) players co-exist in a stable equilibrium almost irrespective of the initial configuration. Interestingly, however, spatial structure often shifts the equilibrium in favor of \(B\) players.

	The Snowdrift Game, Hawk-Dove game and Chicken Game fall into this category. In contrast to the Prisoner's Dilemma, spatial structure is not necessarily beneficial for cooperation and often actually inhibits or eliminates cooperation altogether. For the chosen parameters it results in roughly 25% cooperators as opposed to 40% in the well-mixed case.		The Snowdrift Game, Hawk-Dove game and Chicken Game fall into this category. In contrast to the Prisoner's Dilemma, spatial structure is not necessarily beneficial for cooperation and often actually inhibits or eliminates cooperation altogether. For the chosen parameters it results in roughly 25% cooperators as opposed to 40% in the well-mixed case.

	The above parameters are set to ~~<math>~~R = 1, P = 0, T = 1.6~~</math>~~ and ~~<math>~~S = 0.4~~</math>~~ with Moore neighborhood and players imitating better strategies proportional to the payoff difference. The inital fraction of cooperators is 90%.}}		The above parameters are set to \(R = 1, P = 0, T = 1.6\) and \(S = 0.4\) with Moore neighborhood and players imitating better strategies proportional to the payoff difference. The inital fraction of cooperators is 90%.}}

	[[Category: Christoph Hauert]]		[[Category: Christoph Hauert]]

Hauert at 16:19, 12 June 2012

2012-06-12T16:19:52Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 09:19, 12 June 2012
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	{{~~VirtualLab~~:2x2\|		{{EvoLudoLab:2x2\|
	options="--run --delay 200 --view 0 --reportfreq 1.0 --popsize 100x --popupdate r --playerupdate i --updateprob 1.0 --switchpref 0.0 --geometry m --intertype a1 --numinter 1 --reprotype a8 --initfreqs 1:9 --mutation 0.0 --basefit 1.0 --selection 1.0 --reward 1.0 --punishment 0.0 --temptation 1.6 --sucker 0.4"\|		options="--run --delay 200 --view 0 --reportfreq 1.0 --popsize 100x --popupdate r --playerupdate i --updateprob 1.0 --switchpref 0.0 --geometry m --intertype a1 --numinter 1 --reprotype a8 --initfreqs 1:9 --mutation 0.0 --basefit 1.0 --selection 1.0 --reward 1.0 --punishment 0.0 --temptation 1.6 --sucker 0.4"\|
	title=Co-existence of type A and type B players\|		title=Co-existence of type A and type B players\|

Hauert: moved EvoLudoLabs: Spatial 2x2 Game - Coexistence to EvoLudoLab: Spatial 2x2 Game - Coexistence

2010-01-26T09:45:01Z

moved EvoLudoLabs: Spatial 2x2 Game - Coexistence to EvoLudoLab: Spatial 2x2 Game - Coexistence

← Older revision	Revision as of 02:45, 26 January 2010
(No difference)

Hauert: moved VirtualLab: Spatial 2x2 Game - Coexistence to EvoLudoLabs: Spatial 2x2 Game - Coexistence

2010-01-26T09:44:48Z

moved VirtualLab: Spatial 2x2 Game - Coexistence to EvoLudoLabs: Spatial 2x2 Game - Coexistence

← Older revision	Revision as of 02:44, 26 January 2010
(No difference)

Wikiadmin: New page: {{VirtualLab:2x2| options="--run --delay 200 --view 0 --reportfreq 1.0 --popsize 100x --popupdate r --playerupdate i --updateprob 1.0 --switchpref 0.0 --geometry m --intertype a1 --numinte...

2009-02-03T20:11:41Z

New page: {{VirtualLab:2x2| options="--run --delay 200 --view 0 --reportfreq 1.0 --popsize 100x --popupdate r --playerupdate i --updateprob 1.0 --switchpref 0.0 --geometry m --intertype a1 --numinte...

New page

{{VirtualLab:2x2|
options="--run --delay 200 --view 0 --reportfreq 1.0 --popsize 100x --popupdate r --playerupdate i --updateprob 1.0 --switchpref 0.0 --geometry m --intertype a1 --numinter 1 --reprotype a8 --initfreqs 1:9 --mutation 0.0 --basefit 1.0 --selection 1.0 --reward 1.0 --punishment 0.0 --temptation 1.6 --sucker 0.4"|
title=Co-existence of type A and type B players|
doc=In well-mixed populations type <math>A</math> and <math>B</math> players co-exist in a stable equilibrium almost irrespective of the initial configuration. Interestingly, however, spatial structure often shifts the equilibrium in favor of <math>B</math> players.

The Snowdrift Game, Hawk-Dove game and Chicken Game fall into this category. In contrast to the Prisoner's Dilemma, spatial structure is not necessarily beneficial for cooperation and often actually inhibits or eliminates cooperation altogether. For the chosen parameters it results in roughly 25% cooperators as opposed to 40% in the well-mixed case.

The above parameters are set to <math>R = 1, P = 0, T = 1.6</math> and <math>S = 0.4</math> with Moore neighborhood and players imitating better strategies proportional to the payoff difference. The inital fraction of cooperators is 90%.}}

[[Category: Christoph Hauert]]