EvoLudoLab: 2x2 Game - Coexistence: Difference between revisions

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{{EvoLudoLab:2x2|
{{EvoLudoLab:2x2|
options="--run --delay 200 --view 2 --reportfreq 0.5 --popsize 10000 --popupdate r --playerupdate i --updateprob 1.0 --switchpref 0.0 --geometry M --intertype a1 --numinter 1 --reprotype a1 --initfreqs 1:99 --mutation 0.0 --basefit 1.0 --selection 1.0 --reward 1.0 --punishment 0.0 --temptation 1.62 --sucker 0.38"|
options="--run --delay 200 --view Strategies_-_Mean --reportfreq 0.5 --popsize 10000 --popupdate r --playerupdate i --updateprob 1.0 --switchpref 0.0 --geometry M --intertype a1 --numinter 1 --reprotype a1 --initfreqs 1:99 --mutation 0.0 --basefit 1.0 --selection 1.0 --reward 1.0 --punishment 0.0 --temptation 1.62 --sucker 0.38"|
title=Type A and type B co-exist|
title=Type A and type B co-exist|
doc=Almost independently of the initial configuration, the population quickly converges to a mixed state where type <math>A</math> and <math>B</math> players co-exist.
doc=Almost independently of the initial configuration, the population quickly converges to a mixed state where type <math>A</math> and <math>B</math> players co-exist.

Revision as of 12:42, 18 November 2018

Color code: Cooperators Defectors
New cooperator New defector
Payoffs:
Low High

Note: The gradient of the payoff scale is augmented by pale shades of the strategy colours to mark payoffs that are achieved in homogeneous populations of the corresponding type.

Type A and type B co-exist

Almost independently of the initial configuration, the population quickly converges to a mixed state where type [math]\displaystyle{ A }[/math] and [math]\displaystyle{ B }[/math] players co-exist.

In the context of cooperation, this scenario is captured by the Snowdrift Game, the Hawk-Dove Game or the Chicken Game: the best strategic option depends on the co-player - if he/she defects, it is better to cooperate but if he/she cooperates then defection pays off. Consequently, in a well-mixed population the rare type is always favored and hence cooperators and defectors co-exist in a stable equilibrium. Such interactions indicate another, slightly relaxed form of a social dilemma.

The above parameters are set to [math]\displaystyle{ R = 1, P = 0, T = 1.62 }[/math] and [math]\displaystyle{ S = -0.38 }[/math] with players imitating better strategies proportional to the payoff difference and an initial fraction of cooperators of 99% in a population of size 10'000.

Data views

Strategies - Structure

Snapshot of the spatial arrangement of strategies.

Strategies - Mean

Time evolution of the strategy frequencies.

Fitness - Structure

Snapshot of the spatial distribution of payoffs.

Fitness - Mean

Time evolution of average population payoff bounded by the minimum and maximum individual payoff.

Fitness - Histogram

Snapshot of payoff distribution in population.

Structure - Degree

Degree distribution in structured populations.

Statistics - Fixation probability

Statistics of fixation probabilities.

Statistics - Fixation time

Statistics of fixation and absorption times.

Console log

Message log from engine.

Game parameters

The list below describes only the few parameters related to the Prisoner's Dilemma, Snowdrift and Hawk-Dove games. Follow the link for a complete list and detailed descriptions of the user interface and further parameters such as spatial arrangements or update rules on the player and population level.

--paymatrix <a00,a01;a10,a11>
2x2 payoff matrix. Type \(A\) has index 0 and type \(B\) index 1.
--reward <a11>
the reward for mutual cooperation. The payoff of type \(A\) against its own type (see --paymatrix).
--temptation <a10>
the temptation to defect. The payoff of type \(B\) against type \(A\) (see --paymatrix).
--sucker <a01>
the sucker's payoff of an exploited cooperator. The payoff of type \(A\) against type \(B\) (see --paymatrix).
--punishment <a00>
the punishment for mutual defection. The payoff of type \(B\) against its own type (see --paymatrix).
--init <a,b>
initial frequencies of type \(A\) and \(B\), respectively. Frequencies that do not add up to 100% are scaled accordingly.
--inittype <type>
type of initial configuration:
frequency
random distribution with given frequency
uniform
uniform random distribution
monomorphic
monomorphic initialization
mutant
single mutant in homogeneous population of another type. Mutant and resident types are determined by the types with the lowest and highest frequency, respectively (see option --init).
stripes
stripes of traits
kaleidoscopes
(optional) configurations that produce evolutionary kaleidoscopes for deterministic updates (players and population). Not available for all types of games.