EvoLudoLab: 2x2 Game - Dominance B

Color code:	Cooperators	Defectors
	New cooperator	New defector

Payoffs:	Low High

Note: The gradient of the payoff scale is augmented by pale shades of the strategy colours to mark payoffs that are achieved in homogeneous populations of the corresponding type.

Type B dominates

Irrespective of the initial configuration, type [math]\displaystyle{ B }[/math] players steadily increase and eventually take over the entire population.

In the context of cooperation, this scenario is captured by the Prisoner's Dilemma: Defection is the better option regardless of the co-player's decision. However, as a consequence both players end up with the punishment payoff [math]\displaystyle{ P }[/math] instead of the more favorable reward [math]\displaystyle{ R }[/math] for mutual cooperation. This generates a conflict of interest between the individual and the group (in this case the pair of interacting players). In the absence of any additional mechanisms such as repeated interactions, spatial extension, structured populations etc. cooperative behavior is bound to go extinct.

The applet above has [math]\displaystyle{ R = 1, P = 0, T = 1.16 }[/math] and [math]\displaystyle{ S = -0.16 }[/math] with players imitating better strategies proportional to the payoff difference. The population size is 10'000 and the initial fraction of cooperators 99%.

Data views

Strategies - Structure	Snapshot of the spatial arrangement of strategies.
Strategies - Mean	Time evolution of the strategy frequencies.
Fitness - Structure	Snapshot of the spatial distribution of payoffs.
Fitness - Mean	Time evolution of average population payoff bounded by the minimum and maximum individual payoff.
Fitness - Histogram	Snapshot of payoff distribution in population.
Structure - Degree	Degree distribution in structured populations.
Statistics - Fixation probability	Statistics of fixation probabilities.
Statistics - Fixation time	Statistics of fixation and absorption times.
Console log	Message log from engine.

Game parameters

The list below describes only the few parameters related to the Prisoner's Dilemma, Snowdrift and Hawk-Dove games. Follow the link for a complete list and detailed descriptions of the user interface and further parameters such as spatial arrangements or update rules on the player and population level.

--paymatrix <a00,a01;a10,a11>

2x2 payoff matrix. Type \(A\) has index 0 and type \(B\) index 1.

--reward <a11>

the reward for mutual cooperation. The payoff of type \(A\) against its own type (see --paymatrix).

--temptation <a10>

the temptation to defect. The payoff of type \(B\) against type \(A\) (see --paymatrix).

--sucker <a01>

the sucker's payoff of an exploited cooperator. The payoff of type \(A\) against type \(B\) (see --paymatrix).

--punishment <a00>

the punishment for mutual defection. The payoff of type \(B\) against its own type (see --paymatrix).

--init <a,b>

initial frequencies of type \(A\) and \(B\), respectively. Frequencies that do not add up to 100% are scaled accordingly.

--inittype <type>

type of initial configuration:

frequency

random distribution with given frequency

uniform

uniform random distribution

monomorphic

monomorphic initialization

mutant

single mutant in homogeneous population of another type. Mutant and resident types are determined by the types with the lowest and highest frequency, respectively (see option --init).

stripes

stripes of traits

kaleidoscopes

(optional) configurations that produce evolutionary kaleidoscopes for deterministic updates (players and population). Not available for all types of games.