Spatial games: interaction and competition neighbourhoods: Revision history

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21 February 2025

  • curprev 07:2507:25, 21 February 2025Hauert talk contribs 5,815 bytes 0 →‎Spatial populations
  • curprev 07:2507:25, 21 February 2025Hauert talk contribs 5,815 bytes +5,815 Created page with "The donation game is a particularly convenient instance of a social dilemma with a single parameter given by the cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation, \(r\). In spatial settings limited local interactions and clustering are capable of supporting cooperation by reducing exploitation from defectors. Traditionally the interaction and competition neighbourhoods are identical. Here we discuss intriguing differences in the dynamics that arise when separating the neighbourhoods..."