EvoLudoLab: 2x2 Game - Coexistence: Difference between revisions
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{{EvoLudoLab:2x2| | {{EvoLudoLab:2x2| | ||
options="--run --delay 200 --view Strategies_-_Mean --reportfreq 0.5 --popsize 10000 --popupdate | options="--game 2x2 --run --delay 200 --view Strategies_-_Mean --reportfreq 0.5 --popsize 10000 --popupdate async --playerupdate imitate --geometry M --intertype a --numinter 1 --references a --init 1,999 --inittype frequencies --mutation 0.0 --basefit 1.0 --selection 1.0 --reward 1.0 --punishment 0.0 --temptation 1.62 --sucker 0.38"| | ||
title=Type A and type B co-exist| | title=Type A and type B co-exist| | ||
doc=Almost independently of the initial configuration, the population quickly converges to a mixed state where type <math>A</math> and <math>B</math> players co-exist. | doc=Almost independently of the initial configuration, the population quickly converges to a mixed state where type <math>A</math> and <math>B</math> players co-exist. | ||
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In the context of cooperation, this scenario is captured by the Snowdrift Game, the Hawk-Dove Game or the Chicken Game: the best strategic option depends on the co-player - if he/she defects, it is better to cooperate but if he/she cooperates then defection pays off. Consequently, in a well-mixed population the rare type is always favored and hence cooperators and defectors co-exist in a stable equilibrium. Such interactions indicate another, slightly relaxed form of a social dilemma. | In the context of cooperation, this scenario is captured by the Snowdrift Game, the Hawk-Dove Game or the Chicken Game: the best strategic option depends on the co-player - if he/she defects, it is better to cooperate but if he/she cooperates then defection pays off. Consequently, in a well-mixed population the rare type is always favored and hence cooperators and defectors co-exist in a stable equilibrium. Such interactions indicate another, slightly relaxed form of a social dilemma. | ||
The above parameters are set to <math>R = 1, P = 0, T = 1.62</math> and <math>S = -0.38</math> with players imitating better strategies proportional to the payoff difference and an initial fraction of cooperators of 99% in a population of size 10'000.}} | The above parameters are set to <math>R = 1, P = 0, T = 1.62</math> and <math>S = -0.38</math> with players imitating better strategies proportional to the payoff difference and an initial fraction of cooperators of 99.9% in a population of size 10'000.}} | ||
[[Category: Christoph Hauert]] | [[Category: Christoph Hauert]] | ||
