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EvoLudoLab: Continuous Snowdrift Game - Branching: Difference between revisions

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{{EvoLudoLab:CSD|
{{EvoLudoLab:CSD|
options="--game cSD --run --delay 200 --view Strategies_-_Distribution --reportfreq 20 --popsize 5000 --popupdate r --playerupdate i --updateprob 1.0 --switchpref 0.0 --geometry M --intertype a1 --numinter 1 --reprotype a1 --benefitfcn 11 --benefitparam -1.4:6 --costfcn 1 --costparam -1.6:4.56 --initmean 0.2 --initsdev 0.05 --mutation 0.01 --mutationtype g --mutationsdev 0.01"|
options="--game cSD --run --delay 100 --view Strategies_-_Distribution --reportfreq 20 --popsize 5000 --popupdate r --playerupdate i --geometry M --intertype a1 --numinter 1 --reprotype a1 --benefitfcn 11 --benefitparams 6:-1.4 --costfcn 1 --costparams 4.56:-1.6 --initmean 0.2 --initsdev 0.05 --mutation 0.01 --mutationtype g --mutationsdev 0.01"|
title=Continuous Snowdrift game: Branching|
title=Continuous Snowdrift game: Branching|
doc=Driven by selection and mutation, the population first converges to the convergent stable intermediate level of investments \(x^* = 0.6\). However, since \(x^*\) is not evolutionarily stable, adjacent strategies can invade leading to evolutionary branching, i.e. separating the population into two phenotypic clusters of high and low investing individuals. This process provides a quite natural explanation for the emergence of discrete strategies such as cooperators and defectors.
doc=Driven by selection and mutation, the population first converges to the convergent stable intermediate level of investments \(x^* = 0.6\). However, since \(x^*\) is not evolutionarily stable, adjacent strategies can invade leading to evolutionary branching, i.e. separating the population into two phenotypic clusters of high and low investing individuals. This process provides a quite natural explanation for the emergence of discrete strategies such as cooperators and defectors.


The parameters are set to \(b_0 = -1.4, b_1 = 6, c_0 = -1.6, c_1 = 4.56\) with players imitating better strategies proportional to the payoff difference and an initial traits/investment of \(0.2 \pm 0.05\) in a population of \(5'000\) individuals. Mutations occur with a probability of 1% and the standard deviation of the Gaussian distributed mutations is \(0.01\).}}
The parameters are set to \(b_2 = -1.4, b_1 = 6, c_2 = -1.6, c_1 = 4.56\) with players imitating better strategies proportional to the payoff difference and an initial traits/investment of \(0.2 \pm 0.05\) in a population of \(5'000\) individuals. Mutations occur with a probability of 1% and the standard deviation of the Gaussian distributed mutations is \(0.01\).}}


[[Category: Christoph Hauert]]
[[Category: Christoph Hauert]]
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