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{{CompactTOC|left=yes|name=Publication year| | {{CompactTOC|left=yes|name=Publication year|abc=no|sep=<nowiki> - </nowiki>|side=yes|custom1=2001|custom2=2002|custom3=2003|custom4=2004|custom5=2005|custom6=2006|custom7=2007|custom8=2008|custom9=2009|custom10=2010|custom11=2011|custom12=2012}} | ||
The following list of selected publications features articles that explicitely refer to the ''VirtualLabs'' or | The following list of selected publications features articles that explicitely refer to the ''EvoLudo'' simulator (previously known as ''VirtualLabs'') or present results based on the simulation framework of the ''EvoLudo'' simulator. For a complete list of publications please visit my [http://www.math.ubc.ca/~hauert homepage]. | ||
==2012== | |||
===[[Stochastic dynamics in finite populations|Stochastic differential equations for evolutionary dynamics with demographic noise and mutations]]=== | |||
with Arne Traulsen & Jens-Christian Claussen, ''Phys. Rev. E'' '''85''' 041901 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevE.85.041901 doi: 10.1103/PhysRevE.85.041901]. | |||
'''Summary:''' | |||
Stochastic differential equations (SDE) provide a general framework to describe the evolutionary dynamics of an arbitrary number of types in finite populations. For large, but finite populations demographic noise is included without requiring explicit simulations. Instead, the population size only rescales the amplitude of the noise. Moreover, this framework admits the inclusion of mutations between different types, provided that mutation rates, \(\mu\), are not too small compared to the inverse population size \(1/N\). This ensures that all types are almost always represented in the population and that the occasional extinction of one type does not result in an extended absence of that type. However, for \(\mu N\ll1\) there are well established alternative approximations based on time scale separation. The excellent agreement with simulation based results is illustrated by a generic Rock-Scissors-Paper game with mutations for sufficiently large populations. In the absence of mutations the excellent agreement extends to small population sizes. | |||
===[[Deme Structured Populations|Evolutionary Games in Deme Structured, Finite Populations]]=== | |||
[[Image:Cover JtB 2012.299.png|left|border|120px|link=Deme Structured Populations]] | |||
with Lorens Imhof, ''J. theor. Biol.'' '''299''' 106-112 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.06.010 doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.06.010]. | |||
'''Summary:''' | |||
A fairly general model for the evolutionary dynamics in a sub-divided (or deme structured) population with migration and mutation is presented. The number and size of demes are finite and fixed. The fitness of each individual is determined by pairwise interactions with other members of the same deme. The dynamics within demes can be modeled according to a broad range of evolutionary processes. With a probability proportional to fitness, individuals migrate to another deme. Mutations occur randomly. In the limit of few migrations and even rarer mutations a simple analytic condition for selection to favor one strategic type over another is derived. In particular, the Pareto efficient type is favored when competition within demes is sufficiently weak. The general results are applied to the prisoner’s dilemma game and selected dynamics to discuss the conditions for cooperation to prevail. | |||
==2011== | |||
===[[Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics|Pattern formation and chaos in spatial ecological public goods games]]=== | |||
with Joe Yuichiro Wakano, ''J. theor. Biol.'' '''268''' 30-38 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.09.036 doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.09.036] | |||
'''Summary:''' | |||
Cooperators and defectors can coexist in ecological public goods games. When the game is played in two-dimensional continuous space, a reaction diffusion model produces highly irregular dynamics, in which cooperators and defectors survive in ever-changing configurations. The dynamics is related to the formation of Turing patterns, but the origin of the irregular dynamics is not well understood. This paper, presents a classification of the spatio-temporal dynamics based on the dispersion relation, which reveals that the spontaneous pattern formation can be attributed to the dynamical interplay between two linearly unstable modes: temporal instability arising from a Hopf-bifurcation and spatial instability arising from a Turing-bifurcation. Moreover, a detailed analysis of the highly irregular dynamics through power series, the break-down of symmetry, the maximum Lyapunov exponent, and the excitability of the reaction-term dynamics all support that the dynamics qualifies as spatio-temporal chaos. A particularly interesting type of chaotic dynamics, which was termed intermittent bursts, clearly demonstrates the effects of the two unstable modes where (local) periods of stasis alternate with rapid changes that may induce local extinction. | |||
==2010== | |||
===[[Evolution of Sanctioning Institutions|Social learning promotes institutions for governing the commons]]=== | |||
[[Image:Cover Nature.466.7308.png|left|border|120px|link=Evolution of Sanctioning Institutions]] | |||
with Karl Sigmund, Hannelore De Silva & Arne Traulsen (2010) ''Nature'' '''466''', 861-863 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nature09203 doi: 10.1038/nature09203]. | |||
'''Summary:''' | |||
Theoretical and empirical research highlights the role of punishment in promoting collaborative efforts. However, both the emergence and the stability of costly punishment are problematic issues. It is not clear how punishers can invade a society of defectors by social learning or natural selection, or how second-order free-riders (who contribute to the joint effort but not to the sanctions) can be prevented from drifting into a coercion-based regime and subverting cooperation. Here we compare the prevailing model of peer-punishment with pool-punishment, which consists in committing resources, before the collaborative effort, to prepare sanctions against free-riders. Pool-punishment facilitates the sanctioning of second-order free-riders, because these are exposed even if everyone contributes to the common good. In the absence of such second-order punishment, peer-punishers do better than pool-punishers; but with second-order punishment, the situation is reversed. Efficiency is traded for stability. Neither other-regarding tendencies or preferences for reciprocity and equity, nor group selection or prescriptions from higher authorities, are necessary for the emergence and stability of rudimentary forms of sanctioning institutions regulating common pool resources and enforcing collaborative efforts. | |||
{{-}} | |||
==2009== | ==2009== | ||
===[[Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics| Spatial dynamics of ecological public goods]]=== | ===[[Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics| Spatial dynamics of ecological public goods]]=== | ||
[[Image:Cover PNAS 2009.106.19.png|left|border|120px]] | [[Image:Cover PNAS 2009.106.19.png|left|border|120px|link=Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics]] | ||
with Joe Yuichiro Wakano & Martin A. Nowak (2009) ''Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA'' '''106''', 7910-7914. | with Joe Yuichiro Wakano & Martin A. Nowak (2009) ''Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA'' '''106''', 7910-7914 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0812644106 doi: 10.1073/pnas.0812644106]. | ||
'''Summary:''' | '''Summary:''' | ||
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{{-}} | {{-}} | ||
===[[Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment| Exploration dynamics in evolutionary games]]=== | ===[[Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment|Exploration dynamics in evolutionary games]]=== | ||
[[Image:Cover PNAS 2009.106.png|left|border|120px]] | [[Image:Cover PNAS 2009.106.png|left|border|120px|link=Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment]] | ||
with Arne Traulsen, Hannelore Brandt, Martin A. Nowak & Karl Sigmund (2009) ''Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA'' '''106''', 709-712. | with Arne Traulsen, Hannelore Brandt, Martin A. Nowak & Karl Sigmund (2009) ''Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA'' '''106''', 709-712 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0808450106 doi: 10.1073/pnas.0808450106]. | ||
'''Summary:''' | '''Summary:''' | ||
| Line 24: | Line 57: | ||
==2008== | ==2008== | ||
===[[Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics|Ecological public goods games: Cooperation and bifurcation]]=== | ===[[Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics|Ecological public goods games: Cooperation and bifurcation]]=== | ||
[[Image:Cover TPB 2008.73.png|left|border|120px]] | [[Image:Cover TPB 2008.73.png|left|border|120px|link=Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics]] | ||
with Joe Yuichiro Wakano & Michael Doebeli (2008) ''Theor. Pop. Biol.'' '''73''', 257-263. | with Joe Yuichiro Wakano & Michael Doebeli (2008) ''Theor. Pop. Biol.'' '''73''', 257-263 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tpb.2007.11.007 doi: 10.1016/j.tpb.2007.11.007]. | ||
'''Summary:''' | '''Summary:''' | ||
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==2007== | ==2007== | ||
===[[Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment]]=== | ===[[Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment]]=== | ||
[[Image:Cover Science 2007.316.png|left|border|120px]] | [[Image:Cover Science 2007.316.png|left|border|120px|link=Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment]] | ||
with Arne Traulsen, Hannelore Brandt, Martin A. Nowak & Karl Sigmund (2007) ''Science'' '''316''', 1905-1907. | with Arne Traulsen, Hannelore Brandt, Martin A. Nowak & Karl Sigmund (2007) ''Science'' '''316''', 1905-1907 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1141588 doi: 10.1126/science.1141588]. | ||
'''Summary:''' | '''Summary:''' | ||
| Line 42: | Line 75: | ||
==2006== | ==2006== | ||
===[[Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics|Evolutionary games and population dynamics: maintenance of cooperation in public goods games]]=== | ===[[Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics|Evolutionary games and population dynamics: maintenance of cooperation in public goods games]]=== | ||
[[Image:Cover PRSB 2006.273.png|left|border|120px]] | [[Image:Cover PRSB 2006.273.png|left|border|120px|link=Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics]] | ||
with Miranda Holmes & Michael Doebeli (2006) ''Proc. R. Soc. London B'' '''273''', 2565-2570. | with Miranda Holmes & Michael Doebeli (2006) ''Proc. R. Soc. London B'' '''273''', 2565-2570 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2006.3600 doi: 10.1098/rspb.2006.3600]. | ||
'''Summary:''' | '''Summary:''' | ||
| Line 49: | Line 82: | ||
{{-}} | {{-}} | ||
===[[ | ===[[Cooperation in structured populations|A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks]]=== | ||
[[Image:Cover Nature 2006.441.png|left|border|120px]] | [[Image:Cover Nature 2006.441.png|left|border|120px|link=Cooperation in structured populations]] | ||
with Hisashi Ohtsuki, Erez Lieberman & Martin Nowak (2006) ''Nature'' '''441''', 502-505. | with Hisashi Ohtsuki, Erez Lieberman & Martin Nowak (2006) ''Nature'' '''441''', 502-505 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nature04605 doi: 10.1038/nature04605]. | ||
'''Summary:''' | '''Summary:''' | ||
| Line 58: | Line 91: | ||
{{-}} | {{-}} | ||
===[[Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment|Punishing and abstaining for public goods]]=== | ===[[Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment|Punishing and abstaining for public goods]]=== | ||
[[Image:Cover PNAS 2006.103.png|left|border|120px]] | [[Image:Cover PNAS 2006.103.png|left|border|120px|link=Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment]] | ||
with Hannelore Brandt & Karl Sigmund (2006) ''Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA'' '''103''', 495-497. | with Hannelore Brandt & Karl Sigmund (2006) ''Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA'' '''103''', 495-497 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0507229103 doi: 10.1073/pnas.0507229103]. | ||
'''Summary:''' | '''Summary:''' | ||
| Line 66: | Line 99: | ||
{{-}} | {{-}} | ||
===[[Synergy and discounting of cooperation in social dilemmas]]=== | ===[[Synergy and discounting of cooperation in social dilemmas]]=== | ||
[[Image:Cover JtB 2006.239.png|left|border|120px]] | [[Image:Cover JtB 2006.239.png|left|border|120px|link=Synergy and discounting of cooperation in social dilemmas]] | ||
with Franziska Michor, Martin Nowak & Michael Doebeli (2006) ''J. theor. Biol.'' '''239''', 195-202, Special Issue in Memory of John Maynard Smith. | with Franziska Michor, Martin Nowak & Michael Doebeli (2006) ''J. theor. Biol.'' '''239''', 195-202, Special Issue in Memory of John Maynard Smith [http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2005.08.040 doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2005.08.040]. | ||
'''Summary:''' | '''Summary:''' | ||
| Line 74: | Line 107: | ||
{{-}} | {{-}} | ||
===[[Synergy & discounting of cooperation in social dilemmas|Spatial effects in social dilemmas]]=== | ===[[Synergy & discounting of cooperation in social dilemmas|Spatial effects in social dilemmas]]=== | ||
[[Image:Cover JtB 2006.240.png|left|border|120px]] | [[Image:Cover JtB 2006.240.png|left|border|120px|link=Synergy & discounting of cooperation in social dilemmas]] | ||
(2006) ''J. theor. Biol.'' '''240''', 627-636. | (2006) ''J. theor. Biol.'' '''240''', 627-636 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2005.10.024 doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2005.10.024]. | ||
'''Summary:''' | '''Summary:''' | ||
| Line 82: | Line 115: | ||
{{-}} | {{-}} | ||
==2005== | ==2005== | ||
===[[Evolutionary dynamics on graphs]]=== | ===[[Evolutionary graph theory|Evolutionary dynamics on graphs]]=== | ||
[[Image:Cover Nature 2005.433.png|left|border|120px]] | [[Image:Cover Nature 2005.433.png|left|border|120px|link=Evolutionary graph theory]] | ||
with Erez Lieberman & Martin Nowak (2005) ''Nature'' '''433''', 312-316. | with Erez Lieberman & Martin Nowak (2005) ''Nature'' '''433''', 312-316 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nature03204 doi: 10.1038/nature03204]. | ||
'''Summary:''' | '''Summary:''' | ||
| Line 90: | Line 123: | ||
{{-}} | {{-}} | ||
===[[Cooperation in structured populations|Models of cooperation based on the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snowdrift game]]=== | ===[[Cooperation in structured populations|Models of cooperation based on the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snowdrift game]]=== | ||
[[Image:Cover EcolLett 2005.8.png|left|border|120px]] | [[Image:Cover EcolLett 2005.8.png|left|border|120px|link=Cooperation in structured populations]] | ||
with Michael Doebeli (2005) ''Ecology Letters'' '''8''' (7) 748-766. | with Michael Doebeli (2005) ''Ecology Letters'' '''8''' (7) 748-766 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1461-0248.2005.00773.x doi: 10.1111/j.1461-0248.2005.00773.x]. | ||
'''Summary:''' Understanding the evolution of cooperation through natural selection is a core problem in biology. Here, we review game theoretic models of cooperation that are based on two simple two-person games: the Prisoner's Dilemma, and the Snowdrift game. Both games have two strategies, to cooperate and to defect, and both games are social dilemmas. In social dilemmas, cooperation is prone to exploitation by defectors, and the average payoff in populations at evolutionary equilibrium is lower than in cooperator populations. The difference between the games is that cooperation is not maintained in the Prisoner's Dilemma, but persists in the Snowdrift game at intermediate frequencies. As a consequence, insights gained from studying extensions of the two games differ substantially. We review the most salient results obtained from extensions such as iteration, spatial structure, continuously variable cooperative investments, and multi-person interactions. Bridging the gap between theoretical and empirical research is one of the main challenges for future studies of cooperation, and we conclude by pointing out a number of promising natural systems in which the theory can be tested experimentally. | '''Summary:''' Understanding the evolution of cooperation through natural selection is a core problem in biology. Here, we review game theoretic models of cooperation that are based on two simple two-person games: the Prisoner's Dilemma, and the Snowdrift game. Both games have two strategies, to cooperate and to defect, and both games are social dilemmas. In social dilemmas, cooperation is prone to exploitation by defectors, and the average payoff in populations at evolutionary equilibrium is lower than in cooperator populations. The difference between the games is that cooperation is not maintained in the Prisoner's Dilemma, but persists in the Snowdrift game at intermediate frequencies. As a consequence, insights gained from studying extensions of the two games differ substantially. We review the most salient results obtained from extensions such as iteration, spatial structure, continuously variable cooperative investments, and multi-person interactions. Bridging the gap between theoretical and empirical research is one of the main challenges for future studies of cooperation, and we conclude by pointing out a number of promising natural systems in which the theory can be tested experimentally. | ||
| Line 99: | Line 133: | ||
==2004== | ==2004== | ||
===[[Origin of Cooperators and Defectors|The Evolutionary Origin of Cooperators and Defectors]]=== | ===[[Origin of Cooperators and Defectors|The Evolutionary Origin of Cooperators and Defectors]]=== | ||
[[Image:Cover Science 2004.306.png|left|border|120px]] | [[Image:Cover Science 2004.306.png|left|border|120px|link=Origin of Cooperators and Defectors]] | ||
with Michael Doebeli and Timothy Killingback (2004) ''Science'' '''306''', 859-862. | with Michael Doebeli and Timothy Killingback (2004) ''Science'' '''306''', 859-862 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1101456 doi: 10.1126/science.1101456]. | ||
'''Summary:''' | '''Summary:''' | ||
| Line 107: | Line 141: | ||
{{-}} | {{-}} | ||
===[[Cooperation in structured populations|Spatial Structure Often Inhibits the Evolution of Cooperation in the Snowdrift Game]]=== | ===[[Cooperation in structured populations|Spatial Structure Often Inhibits the Evolution of Cooperation in the Snowdrift Game]]=== | ||
[[Image:Cover Nature 2004.428.png|left|border|120px]] | [[Image:Cover Nature 2004.428.png|left|border|120px|link=Cooperation in structured populations]] | ||
with Michael Doebeli (2004) ''Nature'' '''428''', 643-646. | with Michael Doebeli (2004) ''Nature'' '''428''', 643-646 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nature02360 doi: 10.1038/nature02360]. | ||
'''Summary:''' | '''Summary:''' | ||
| Line 116: | Line 150: | ||
==2002== | ==2002== | ||
===[[Voluntary Public Goods Games|Volunteering as Red Queen Mechanism for Cooperation in Public Goods Games]]=== | ===[[Voluntary Public Goods Games|Volunteering as Red Queen Mechanism for Cooperation in Public Goods Games]]=== | ||
[[Image:Cover Science 2002.296.png|left|border|120px]] | [[Image:Cover Science 2002.296.png|left|border|120px|link=Voluntary Public Goods Games]] | ||
with Silvia De Monte, Josef Hofbauer and Karl Sigmund (2002) ''Science'' '''296''' 1129-1132. | with Silvia De Monte, Josef Hofbauer and Karl Sigmund (2002) ''Science'' '''296''' 1129-1132 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1070582 doi: 10.1126/science.1070582]. | ||
'''Summary:''' | '''Summary:''' | ||
| Line 124: | Line 158: | ||
{{-}} | {{-}} | ||
===[[Voluntary Public Goods Games|Phase Transitions and Volunteering in Spatial Public Goods Games]]=== | ===[[Voluntary Public Goods Games|Phase Transitions and Volunteering in Spatial Public Goods Games]]=== | ||
[[Image:Cover PRL 2002.89.png|left|border|120px]] | [[Image:Cover PRL 2002.89.png|left|border|120px|link=Voluntary Public Goods Games]] | ||
with György Szabó (2002) ''Physical Review Letters'' '''89''' (11) 118101. | with György Szabó (2002) ''Physical Review Letters'' '''89''' (11) 118101 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.89.118101 doi: 10.1103/PhysRevLett.89.118101]. | ||
'''Summary:''' | '''Summary:''' | ||
| Line 132: | Line 166: | ||
{{-}} | {{-}} | ||
===[[Voluntary Public Goods Games|Prisoner's Dilemma and Public Goods Games in Different Geometries: Compulsory Versus Voluntary Interactions]]=== | ===[[Voluntary Public Goods Games|Prisoner's Dilemma and Public Goods Games in Different Geometries: Compulsory Versus Voluntary Interactions]]=== | ||
[[Image:Cover Complexity 2002.8.png|left|border|120px]] | [[Image:Cover Complexity 2002.8.png|left|border|120px|link=Voluntary Public Goods Games]] | ||
with György Szabó (2002) ''Complexity'' '''8''' (4) 31-38. | with György Szabó (2002) ''Complexity'' '''8''' (4) 31-38 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/cplx.10092 doi: 10.1002/cplx.10092]. | ||
'''Summary:''' | '''Summary:''' | ||
| Line 140: | Line 174: | ||
{{-}} | {{-}} | ||
===[[2×2 Games|Effects of Space in 2×2 games]]=== | ===[[2×2 Games|Effects of Space in 2×2 games]]=== | ||
[[Image:Cover IJBC 2002.12.png|left|border|120px]] | [[Image:Cover IJBC 2002.12.png|left|border|120px|link=2×2 Games]] | ||
(2002) ''Int. Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos'' '''12''' 1531-1548 | (2002) ''Int. Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos'' '''12''' 1531-1548 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S0218127402005273 doi: 10.1142/S0218127402005273]. | ||
'''Summary:''' | '''Summary:''' | ||
| Line 149: | Line 183: | ||
==2001== | ==2001== | ||
===[[Reward, punishment & reputation|Reward and punishment]]=== | ===[[Reward, punishment & reputation|Reward and punishment]]=== | ||
[[Image:Cover PNAS 2001.98.png|left|border|120px]] | [[Image:Cover PNAS 2001.98.png|left|border|120px|link=Reward, punishment & reputation]] | ||
with Karl Sigmund & Martin A. Nowak (2001) ''Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA'' '''98''' 10757 - 10762. | with Karl Sigmund & Martin A. Nowak (2001) ''Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA'' '''98''' 10757-10762 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.161155698 doi: 10.1073/pnas.161155698]. | ||
'''Summary:''' | '''Summary:''' | ||
