EvoLudoLab: Continuous Snowdrift Game - Attractor: Difference between revisions

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{{EvoLudoLab:CSD|
{{EvoLudoLab:CSD|
options="--run --delay 200 --view 3 --reportfreq 20 --popsize 5000 --popupdate r --playerupdate i --updateprob 1.0 --switchpref 0.0 --geometry M --intertype a1 --numinter 1 --reprotype a1 --benefitfcn 11 --benefitparam -1.5:7 --costfcn 1 --costparam -1:4.6 --initmean 0.2 --initsdev 0.05 --mutation 0.01 --mutationtype g --mutationsdev 0.01"|
options="--game cSD --run --delay 100 --view Strategies_-_Distribution --reportfreq 20 --popsize 5000 --popupdate async --playerupdate imitate --geometry M --intertype r1 --numinter 1 --references r1 --benefitfcn 11 --benefitparams 7,-1.5 --costfcn 1 --costparams 4.6,-1 --init 0.2,0.01 --inittype gaussian --mutation 0.01 --mutationtype g --mutationsdev 0.01"|
title=Continuous Snowdrift game: Attractor|
title=Continuous Snowdrift game: Attractor|
doc=Driven by selection and mutation, the population converges to stable intermediate investment levels (<math>x^*=0.6</math>). The equilibrium <math>x*</math> is an attractor, i.e. it is convergent stable ''and'' evolutionary stable.
doc=Driven by selection and mutation, the population converges to stable intermediate investment levels (\(x^*=0.6\) ). The equilibrium \(x*\) is an attractor, i.e. it is convergent stable ''and'' evolutionary stable.


The parameters are set to <math>b_0 = -1.5, b_1 = 7, c_0 = -1, c_1 = 4.6</math> with players imitating better strategies proportional to the payoff difference and an initial trait/investment distribution with <math>0.2\pm 0.05</math> in a population of 5'000 individuals. Mutations occur with a probability of 1% and the standard deviation of the Gaussian distributed mutations is <math>0.01</math>.}}
The parameters are set to \(b_2 = -1.5, b_1 = 7, c_2 = -1, c_1 = 4.6\) with players imitating better strategies proportional to the payoff difference and an initial trait/investment distribution with \(0.2\pm 0.05\) in a population of 5'000 individuals. Mutations occur with a probability of 1% and the standard deviation of the Gaussian distributed mutations is \(0.01\).}}


[[Category: Christoph Hauert]]
[[Category: Christoph Hauert]]

Revision as of 14:09, 13 October 2023

Color code: Maximum Minimum Mean
Investments:
Minimum Maximum
Payoffs & Densities:
Low High

Continuous Snowdrift game: Attractor

Driven by selection and mutation, the population converges to stable intermediate investment levels (\(x^*=0.6\) ). The equilibrium \(x*\) is an attractor, i.e. it is convergent stable and evolutionary stable.

The parameters are set to \(b_2 = -1.5, b_1 = 7, c_2 = -1, c_1 = 4.6\) with players imitating better strategies proportional to the payoff difference and an initial trait/investment distribution with \(0.2\pm 0.05\) in a population of 5'000 individuals. Mutations occur with a probability of 1% and the standard deviation of the Gaussian distributed mutations is \(0.01\).

Data views

Strategies - Structure

Snapshot of the spatial arrangement of strategies.

Strategies - Structure 3D

3D view of snapshot of the spatial arrangement of strategies.

Strategies - Mean

Time evolution of the strategy frequencies.

Strategies - Histogram

Snapshot of strategy distribution in population

Strategies - Distribution

Time evolution of the strategy distribution

Fitness - Structure

Snapshot of the spatial distribution of payoffs.

Fitness - Structure 3D

3D view of snapshot of the spatial distribution of payoffs.

Fitness - Mean

Time evolution of average population payoff bounded by the minimum and maximum individual payoff.

Fitness - Histogram

Snapshot of payoff distribution in population.

Structure - Degree

Degree distribution in structured populations.

Console log

Message log from engine.

Game parameters

The list below describes only the few parameters related to the continuous snowdrift game. Follow the link for a complete list and descriptions of all other parameters e.g. referring to update mechanisms of players and the population.

--benefitfcn <f1[,f2[...]]>
benefit function for each trait:
0: \(B(x,y)=b_0\ y\)
benefits linear in opponents investment \(y\).
1: \(B(x,y)=b_0\ y+b_1\ y^2\)
benefits quadratic in opponents investment \(y\).
2: \(B(x,y)=b_0 \sqrt{y}\)
\(\sqrt{\ }\)-saturating benefits for opponents investment \(y\)
3: \(B(x,y)=b_0 \ln(b_1\ y+1)\)
\(\ln\)-saturating benefits for opponents investment \(y\)
4: \(B(x,y)=b_0 (1-\exp(-b_1\ y))\)
\(\exp\)-saturating benefits for opponents investment \(y\)
10: \(B(x,y)=b_0 (x+y)\)
benefits linear in joint investments \(x+y\).
11: \(B(x,y)=b_0 (x+y)+b_1\ (x+y)^2\)
benefits quadratic in joint investments \(x+y\) (default).
12: \(B(x,y)=b_0 \sqrt{x+y}\)
\(\sqrt{\ }\)-saturating benefits for joint investments \(x+y\)
13: \(B(x,y)=b_0 \ln(b_1\ (x+y)+1)\)
\(\ln\)-saturating benefits for joint investments \(x+y\)
14: \(B(x,y)=b_0 (1-\exp(-b_1\ (x+y)))\)
\(\exp\)-saturating benefits for joint investments \(x+y\)
20: \(B(x,y)=b_0 x+b_1\ y+b_2\ x\ y\)
benefits linear in investments \(x\) and \(y\) as well as cross term \(x\,y\).
30: \(B(x,y)=b_0 x\)
benefits linear in own investments \(x\).
31: \(B(x,y)=b_0 x+b_1\ x^2\)
benefits quadratic in own investments \(x\).
32: \(B(x,y)=b_0 x+b_1\ x^2+b_2\ x^3\)
benefits cubic in own investments \(x\).
--benefitparams <b0>[,<b1>[...[;<b'0>[,<b'1>[...]]]]]
parameters \(b_i\) for benefit function of each trait.
--costfcn <f1[,f2[...]]>
cost function for each trait:
0: \(C(x,y)=c_0\ x\)
costs linear in own investment \(x\).
1: \(C(x,y)=c_0\ x+c_1\ x^2\)
costs quadratic in own investment \(x\) (default).
2: \(C(x,y)=c_0 \sqrt{x}\)
\(\sqrt{\ }\)-saturating costs for own investment \(x\)
3: \(C(x,y)=c_0 \ln(c_1\ x+1)\)
\(\ln\)-saturating costs for own investment \(x\)
4: \(C(x,y)=c_0 (1-\exp(-c_1\ x))\)
\(\exp\)-saturating costs for own investment \(x\)
10: \(C(x,y)=c_0 (x+y)\)
costs linear in joint investments \(x+y\).
11: \(C(x,y)=c_0 (x+y)+c_1\ (x+y)^2\)
costs quadratic in joint investments \(x+y\).
12: \(C(x,y)=c_0 (x+y)+c_1\ (x+y)^2+c_2\ (x+y)^3\)
costs cubic in joint investments \(x+y\).
13: \(C(x,y)=c_0 (x+y)+c_1\ (x+y)^2+c_2\ (x+y)^3+c_3\ (x+y)^4\)
costs quartic in joint investments \(x+y\).
20: \(C(x,y)=c_0 x+c_1\ y+c_2\ x\ y\)
costs linear in investments \(x\) and \(y\) as well as cross term \(x\,y\).
--costparams <c0>[,<c1>[...[;<c'0>[,<c'1>[...]]]]]
parameters \(c_i\) for cost function of each trait.
--init <m[,s]>
Initial configuration with mean trait m and standard deviation s (or mutant trait, see --inittype).
--inittype <t>
type of initial configuration:
uniform
uniform trait distribution.
mono
monomorphic trait distribution for mean trait (see --init <m[,s]>).
gaussian
Gaussian trait distribution with mean m and standard deviation s (see --init <m,s>).
delta
mutant with trait s in monomorphic population with trait m (see --init <m,s>).