EvoLudoLab: Continuous Snowdrift Game - Attractor: Difference between revisions
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{{EvoLudoLab:CSD| | {{EvoLudoLab:CSD| | ||
options="--run --delay | options="--module cSD --run --delay 100 --view Strategies_-_Distribution --timestep 20 --popsize 5000 --popupdate async --playerupdate imitate --geometry M --interactions r1 --references r1 --benefits 11 7,-1.5 --costs 1 4.6,-1 --init gaussian 0.2,0.01 --mutation 0.01 gaussian 0.01"| | ||
title=Continuous Snowdrift game: Attractor| | title=Continuous Snowdrift game: Attractor| | ||
doc=Driven by selection and mutation, the population converges to stable intermediate investment levels ( | doc=Driven by selection and mutation, the population converges to stable intermediate investment levels (\(x^*=0.6\) ). The equilibrium \(x*\) is an attractor, i.e. it is convergent stable ''and'' evolutionary stable. | ||
The parameters are set to | The parameters are set to \(b_2 = -1.5, b_1 = 7, c_2 = -1, c_1 = 4.6\) with players imitating better strategies proportional to the payoff difference and an initial trait/investment distribution with \(0.2\pm 0.05\) in a population of 5'000 individuals. Mutations occur with a probability of 1% and the standard deviation of the Gaussian distributed mutations is \(0.01\).}} | ||
[[Category: Christoph Hauert]] | [[Category: Christoph Hauert]] |
Latest revision as of 13:44, 12 August 2024
Color code: | Maximum | Minimum | Mean |
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Investments: | Minimum Maximum
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Payoffs & Densities: | Low High
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Continuous Snowdrift game: Attractor
Driven by selection and mutation, the population converges to stable intermediate investment levels (\(x^*=0.6\) ). The equilibrium \(x*\) is an attractor, i.e. it is convergent stable and evolutionary stable.
The parameters are set to \(b_2 = -1.5, b_1 = 7, c_2 = -1, c_1 = 4.6\) with players imitating better strategies proportional to the payoff difference and an initial trait/investment distribution with \(0.2\pm 0.05\) in a population of 5'000 individuals. Mutations occur with a probability of 1% and the standard deviation of the Gaussian distributed mutations is \(0.01\).
Data views
Snapshot of the spatial arrangement of strategies. | |
3D view of snapshot of the spatial arrangement of strategies. | |
Time evolution of the strategy frequencies. | |
Snapshot of strategy distribution in population | |
Time evolution of the strategy distribution | |
Snapshot of the spatial distribution of payoffs. | |
3D view of snapshot of the spatial distribution of payoffs. | |
Time evolution of average population payoff bounded by the minimum and maximum individual payoff. | |
Snapshot of payoff distribution in population. | |
Degree distribution in structured populations. | |
Message log from engine. |
Game parameters
The list below describes only the few parameters related to the continuous snowdrift game. Follow the link for a complete list and descriptions of all other parameters e.g. referring to update mechanisms of players and the population.
- --benefitfcn <f1[,f2[...]]>
- benefit function for each trait:
- 0: \(B(x,y)=b_0\ y\)
- benefits linear in opponents investment \(y\).
- 1: \(B(x,y)=b_0\ y+b_1\ y^2\)
- benefits quadratic in opponents investment \(y\).
- 2: \(B(x,y)=b_0 \sqrt{y}\)
- \(\sqrt{\ }\)-saturating benefits for opponents investment \(y\)
- 3: \(B(x,y)=b_0 \ln(b_1\ y+1)\)
- \(\ln\)-saturating benefits for opponents investment \(y\)
- 4: \(B(x,y)=b_0 (1-\exp(-b_1\ y))\)
- \(\exp\)-saturating benefits for opponents investment \(y\)
- 10: \(B(x,y)=b_0 (x+y)\)
- benefits linear in joint investments \(x+y\).
- 11: \(B(x,y)=b_0 (x+y)+b_1\ (x+y)^2\)
- benefits quadratic in joint investments \(x+y\) (default).
- 12: \(B(x,y)=b_0 \sqrt{x+y}\)
- \(\sqrt{\ }\)-saturating benefits for joint investments \(x+y\)
- 13: \(B(x,y)=b_0 \ln(b_1\ (x+y)+1)\)
- \(\ln\)-saturating benefits for joint investments \(x+y\)
- 14: \(B(x,y)=b_0 (1-\exp(-b_1\ (x+y)))\)
- \(\exp\)-saturating benefits for joint investments \(x+y\)
- 20: \(B(x,y)=b_0 x+b_1\ y+b_2\ x\ y\)
- benefits linear in investments \(x\) and \(y\) as well as cross term \(x\,y\).
- 30: \(B(x,y)=b_0 x\)
- benefits linear in own investments \(x\).
- 31: \(B(x,y)=b_0 x+b_1\ x^2\)
- benefits quadratic in own investments \(x\).
- 32: \(B(x,y)=b_0 x+b_1\ x^2+b_2\ x^3\)
- benefits cubic in own investments \(x\).
- --benefitparams <b0>[,<b1>[...[;<b'0>[,<b'1>[...]]]]]
- parameters \(b_i\) for benefit function of each trait.
- --costfcn <f1[,f2[...]]>
- cost function for each trait:
- 0: \(C(x,y)=c_0\ x\)
- costs linear in own investment \(x\).
- 1: \(C(x,y)=c_0\ x+c_1\ x^2\)
- costs quadratic in own investment \(x\) (default).
- 2: \(C(x,y)=c_0 \sqrt{x}\)
- \(\sqrt{\ }\)-saturating costs for own investment \(x\)
- 3: \(C(x,y)=c_0 \ln(c_1\ x+1)\)
- \(\ln\)-saturating costs for own investment \(x\)
- 4: \(C(x,y)=c_0 (1-\exp(-c_1\ x))\)
- \(\exp\)-saturating costs for own investment \(x\)
- 10: \(C(x,y)=c_0 (x+y)\)
- costs linear in joint investments \(x+y\).
- 11: \(C(x,y)=c_0 (x+y)+c_1\ (x+y)^2\)
- costs quadratic in joint investments \(x+y\).
- 12: \(C(x,y)=c_0 (x+y)+c_1\ (x+y)^2+c_2\ (x+y)^3\)
- costs cubic in joint investments \(x+y\).
- 13: \(C(x,y)=c_0 (x+y)+c_1\ (x+y)^2+c_2\ (x+y)^3+c_3\ (x+y)^4\)
- costs quartic in joint investments \(x+y\).
- 20: \(C(x,y)=c_0 x+c_1\ y+c_2\ x\ y\)
- costs linear in investments \(x\) and \(y\) as well as cross term \(x\,y\).
- --costparams <c0>[,<c1>[...[;<c'0>[,<c'1>[...]]]]]
- parameters \(c_i\) for cost function of each trait.
- --init <m[,s]>
- Initial configuration with mean trait m and standard deviation s (or mutant trait, see --inittype).
- --inittype <t>
- type of initial configuration:
- uniform
- uniform trait distribution.
- mono
- monomorphic trait distribution for mean trait (see --init <m[,s]>).
- gaussian
- Gaussian trait distribution with mean m and standard deviation s (see --init <m,s>).
- delta
- mutant with trait s in monomorphic population with trait m (see --init <m,s>).