EvoLudoLab: 2x2 Game - Dominance B: Difference between revisions
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{{EvoLudoLab:2x2| | {{EvoLudoLab:2x2| | ||
options="--run --delay 200 --view Strategies_-_Mean --reportfreq 0.5 --popsize 10000 --popupdate | options="--game 2x2 --run --delay 200 --view Strategies_-_Mean --reportfreq 0.5 --popsize 10000 --popupdate async --playerupdate imitate --geometry M --intertype a --numinter 1 --references a --init 1,999 --inittype frequencies --mutation 0.0 --basefit 1.0 --selection 1.0 --reward 1.0 --punishment 0.0 --temptation 1.16 --sucker -0.16"| | ||
title=Type B dominates| | title=Type B dominates| | ||
doc=Irrespective of the initial configuration, type <math>B</math> players steadily increase and eventually take over the entire population. | doc=Irrespective of the initial configuration, type <math>B</math> players steadily increase and eventually take over the entire population. | ||
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In the context of cooperation, this scenario is captured by the Prisoner's Dilemma: Defection is the better option regardless of the co-player's decision. However, as a consequence both players end up with the punishment payoff <math>P</math> instead of the more favorable reward <math>R</math> for mutual cooperation. This generates a conflict of interest between the individual and the group (in this case the pair of interacting players). In the absence of any additional mechanisms such as repeated interactions, spatial extension, structured populations etc. cooperative behavior is bound to go extinct. | In the context of cooperation, this scenario is captured by the Prisoner's Dilemma: Defection is the better option regardless of the co-player's decision. However, as a consequence both players end up with the punishment payoff <math>P</math> instead of the more favorable reward <math>R</math> for mutual cooperation. This generates a conflict of interest between the individual and the group (in this case the pair of interacting players). In the absence of any additional mechanisms such as repeated interactions, spatial extension, structured populations etc. cooperative behavior is bound to go extinct. | ||
The applet above has <math>R = 1, P = 0, T = 1.16</math> and <math>S = -0.16</math> with players imitating better strategies proportional to the payoff difference. The population size is 10'000 and the initial fraction of cooperators 99%.}} | The applet above has <math>R = 1, P = 0, T = 1.16</math> and <math>S = -0.16</math> with players imitating better strategies proportional to the payoff difference. The population size is 10'000 and the initial fraction of cooperators 99.9%.}} | ||
[[Category: Christoph Hauert]] | [[Category: Christoph Hauert]] | ||
Revision as of 14:49, 13 October 2023
| Color code: | Cooperators | Defectors |
|---|---|---|
| New cooperator | New defector |
| Payoffs: | Low High
|
|---|
Note: The gradient of the payoff scale is augmented by pale shades of the strategy colours to mark payoffs that are achieved in homogeneous populations of the corresponding type.
Type B dominates
Irrespective of the initial configuration, type players steadily increase and eventually take over the entire population.
In the context of cooperation, this scenario is captured by the Prisoner's Dilemma: Defection is the better option regardless of the co-player's decision. However, as a consequence both players end up with the punishment payoff instead of the more favorable reward for mutual cooperation. This generates a conflict of interest between the individual and the group (in this case the pair of interacting players). In the absence of any additional mechanisms such as repeated interactions, spatial extension, structured populations etc. cooperative behavior is bound to go extinct.
The applet above has and with players imitating better strategies proportional to the payoff difference. The population size is 10'000 and the initial fraction of cooperators 99.9%.
Data views
| Snapshot of the spatial arrangement of strategies. | |
| Time evolution of the strategy frequencies. | |
| Snapshot of the spatial distribution of payoffs. | |
| Time evolution of average population payoff bounded by the minimum and maximum individual payoff. | |
| Snapshot of payoff distribution in population. | |
| Degree distribution in structured populations. | |
| Statistics of fixation probabilities. | |
| Statistics of fixation and absorption times. | |
| Statistics of the stationary distribution of the numbers of each strategic type. Note, only available for non-zero mutation rates. | |
| Message log from engine. |
Module parameters
The list below describes only the few parameters related to the Prisoner's Dilemma, Snowdrift and Hawk-Dove games. Follow the link for a complete list and detailed descriptions of the user interface and further parameters such as spatial arrangements or update rules on the player and population level.
- --paymatrix <a00,a01;a10,a11>
- 2x2 payoff matrix. Type \(A\) has index 0 and type \(B\) index 1.
- --inittype <type>
- type of initial configuration:
- frequency <f0>,<f1>...
- random distribution with given trait frequencies, f0, f1,.... Note, only available for frequency based modules and models.
- density <d0>,<d1>...
- initial trait densities <d1,...,dn>. Note, only available for density based modules and models.
- uniform
- uniform random distribution, equal frequencies of all traits.
- monomorphic <t>[,<v>]
- monomorphic initialization with trait t. Note, for modules with variable population densities, the optional parameter v indicates the initial frequency of vacant sites. If omitted the monomorphic trait is initialized at its (estimated) carrying capacity.
- mutant <m>,<r>[,<v>]
- single mutant with trait m in homogeneous resident population of type r. The mutant is placed in a location selected uniformly at random (mutants arising through cosmic rays). Note, for modules with variable population densities, the optional parameter v indicates the initial frequency of vacant sites. If omitted the resident trait is initialized at its (estimated) carrying capacity.
- temperature <m>,<r>[,<v>]
- single mutant with trait m in homogeneous resident population of type r. The mutant is placed in a location selected proportional to the in-degree of nodes (temperature initialization, mutants arising through errors in reproduction). Note, for modules with variable population densities, the optional parameter v indicates the initial frequency of vacant sites. If omitted the resident trait is initialized at its (estimated) carrying capacity.
- stripes
- stripes of traits. Note, only available for 2D lattices.
- kaleidoscopes
- configurations that produce evolutionary kaleidoscopes for deterministic updates (players and population). Note, only available for some modules.
Note, for modules that admit multiple species, the initialization types for each species can be specified as an array separated by ;. With more species than initialization types, they are assigned in a cyclical manner.